When states have ceased to uphold democratic principles, diasporic communities become the victims of transnational repression. State surveillance and repression are inherent in many authoritarian states around the world and are used to keep their citizens under control. Eritrea is a case in point, as evidenced by the centrality of transnational repression in the 2020 annual report of Freedom House, which points out that members of the Eritrean diaspora are subject to surveillance and harassment by the Eritrean government. Similarly, the report of the European Asylum Support Office (2019) maintains that Eritrean embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic or government-affiliated offices operating in foreign countries try to monitor the activities of opposition groups. This is further confirmed by the February 2020 report of the Danish Immigration Service, whose sources indicate that the Eritrean diaspora is penetrated by government spies.
Background Information
The Eritrean War of Independence (1961-91) serves as the backdrop for recent Eritrean history. For three decades, Eritrea fought against Ethiopia, its powerful neighbor. Rebel leader Isaias Afewerki and his troops were victorious. In 1991, soon after gaining independence, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) became the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). In its founding statement in 1994, the PFDJ promised to establish a system based on popular sovereignty, democratic values, accountability, transparency, pluralism, and tolerance. However, as of 2025, Eritrea has still not achieved these goals. Instead of accountability, transparency, and tolerance, Eritreans both at home and in the diaspora live under secrecy, authoritarianism, and fear. Afewerki, who is now 79 years old, was initially seen as a reformer, but contrary to his avowed principles, he closed universities and imprisoned his critics without trial. He did away with elections, free newspapers, and independent courts. Consequently, Eritrea witnessed a huge exodus of refugees during the first quarter of the 21st century. As confirmed by the World Migration Report (2024), Eritrea ranked among the top ten countries of origin for the world’s refugee population. The Eritrean diaspora consists of two generations of migrants/refugees. The first is made up of those who fled conflict and violence during the war of independence from 1961 to 1991, when Eritreans fought Ethiopian occupation. The second generation comprises exiles who fled violence and political repression after Eritrea’s independence, many of whom left after 2003 because the government decided to extend military and national service conscription indefinitely.
The Eritrean diaspora is primarily concentrated in Europe and North America, alongside significant communities in Africa, the Middle East, and Australia. As a prominent voice of resistance, the Arbi Harnet (Freedom Friday) Movement, founded in 2011 by Eritrean activists in the United States and Europe, aims at publicly challenging the government of Isaias Afwerki. Protest, however, is far from universal. According to Glatthard, the diaspora comprises four political groups: the government loyalists, the opponents of the regime, a civil society group based on human rights, and a silent group that does not want to interfere in politics. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish political adherences among members of the diaspora, given the diversity of the population. Neither the nine ethnic groups – the official languages are Tigrenian and Arabic – nor the religion – Coptic Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, among others – are the deciding factor. Most often, Eritreans are politically categorized and mobilized based on their regional origin: people from the region around the capital Asmara tend to be more loyal to the government, while those from the southern highlands tend to be more critical of the regime.
Surveillance in the diaspora
The authoritarian regime of Eritrea utilizes many of the stock tactics of transnational repression to control and exert influence over its diaspora. These include strategies such as intimidation, collaboration, and appeals to patriotic sentiments to gain legitimacy.
Despite being physically distant from its citizens, the Eritrean government closely monitors the Eritrean diaspora through various tools. For nearly a quarter of a century, it has employed strategies of transnational repression with the aim of preventing opposition movements, ensuring the survival of the current regime in Eritrea, and suppressing the political influence of the diaspora on the homeland’s politics. The Eritrean regime has developed a system of surveillance, repression, and co-optation disguised under the umbrella of civil societies, embassies, and consulates to control the diaspora population. For example, in the Eritrean diaspora in Switzerland, so-called agents systematically collect information through direct questioning, surveillance in public spaces, video recordings, and phone tapping. These informants reportedly use informal conversations, often under the pretense of casual discussions, to extract political views, and then relay this information to the government. Translation services are also vulnerable as covers for government agents or information sources on diaspora members. The transnational mechanism functions as a barrier or a destructive catalyst for transnational political engagements among Eritrean diasporas.
Eritrean government agents and spies in the diaspora can be divided into two groups: First, those who emigrated during the war, consisting of independence and EPLF loyalists; and second, the more recent ones who fled to escape conscription and national service but for various reasons, such as financial incentives or fear, decide to cooperate with state agents abroad. They collaborate closely with embassies, consulates, and government officials, gathering and documenting information about diaspora activities by maintaining watch lists and capturing photos or videos of dissenters at protests or opposition events.
According to the UN Human Rights Committee’s submission to the non-governmental organization East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project in February 2019, the Eritrean government has extensive capabilities, particularly in Europe, to monitor the activities of Eritreans in the diaspora. This spreads fear and prevents Eritreans from speaking out on human rights issues. Furthermore, activists in the diaspora are apprehensive that their friends and family members in Eritrea will be penalized by the security forces. This fear has been confirmed by the the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (2016), which pointed out the threats, arbitrary arrests, and disappearances experienced by family members of activists in the diaspora.
Assaults on activists in the diaspora
In June 2019, Amnesty International (AI) reported that Eritrean activists, journalists, and human rights defenders living abroad who criticize the Eritrean government face harassment and threats from government employees and supporters of the ruling PFDJ. As AI demonstrates, fleeing Eritrea does not mean the end of repression, for the “long arm” of the Eritrean state reaches out through the embassies and supporters of the PJDF. According to AI, the youth wing of the PFDJ, the YPFDJ (Young People’s Front for Democracy and Justice), is particularly involved in intimidation, attacks and other harassment against government critics at the behest of the PFDJ and the respective Eritrean embassies.
One of the methods the Eritrean government uses to keep its diaspora under control in the receiving country is to infiltrate the asylum translation service with Eritreans close to the embassy. Thereby, supporters of the Eritrean government are able to collect information on asylum seekers. Thus, the Eritrean government is able to easily identify those who have left to evade compulsory military service, intimidating and isolating them from opposition groups. In turn, those deserters who join opposition groups despite pressure are intimidated by their own family members in Eritrea.
Moreover, the Eritrean government has, over time, developed, shaped and refined the mechanisms of transnational control. Deserters who join opposition groups despite repression face the fear of government retribution on their family members in Eritrea. Furthermore, the regime forces Eritreans in the diaspora to pay 2% of their income from their host country to the Eritrean government. In 2009, the United States Committee on Refugees and Immigrants stated that the Eritrean government had received ‘credible reports’ about monitoring refugees living overseas. Critics are not only monitored but also physically threatened and defamed on social media. Amnesty International interviewed 18 human rights activists in the diaspora who reported various types of abuse; it also documented that family members of government critics in the diaspora are harassed and threatened in Eritrea. Thus, fear of reprisals from the Eritrean regime’s intelligence agents makes diaspora members live in fear of the persecution of their families in the homeland. As a result, they remain silent.
Conclusion
Defining transnational repression as the direct or indirect coercion of diaspora groups by foreign powers may well serve as the first step toward drawing up policy recommendations to combat this infringement of basic human rights. Oppression need not stop with the diasporic community but can also be directed against all US and European citizens involved with or exposed to foreign powers. From this perspective, transnational repression has the potential to infect all levels of society. Unfortunately, the lack of sufficient empirical data limits our ability to provide an evidence-based picture of the true extent and consequences of the problem. However, documented and recorded cases and in-depth interviews with affected individuals suggest that for many diaspora groups, such as the Eritrean, members are hindered from integration into their adopted countries and participation in democratic processes. As well, repression may limit democratic participation for ethnic US and European citizens with interests or sensitivities linked to the country of origin. Moreover, due to the pressure faced by independent journalists and human rights defenders within the diaspora community, the development of independent and critical information about the perpetrator countries is obstructed, thereby hindering the democratic society’s right to accurate and unbiased information.
To prevent transnational repression, security and social policymakers should work in coordination with clearly defined sectoral responsibilities, such as law enforcement, migration control, diplomatic relations, and human rights advocacy. At the same time, they should establish a systematic record of reports on transnational oppression to enable scientific analysis and help policymakers recognize the problem.
*image credit: VOA.
