Hard experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan made the United States reticent to ever pursue regime change. These conflicts instilled a useful humility about the limitations of American power, but also an unproductive self-doubt about America’s ability to manage post-conflict governance. This lack of confidence is shaping American behavior, encouraging the U.S. to support Venezuela’s criminal regime and preventing it from imagining a better future for Iran. Acknowledging shortcomings in Iraq and Afghanistan is important but shouldn’t cause Americans to believe that failure is the only possible outcome of regime change.
Two factors drove many of the weak outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first was a lack of post-conflict planning. The second was an absence in both countries of the conditions that were necessary to establish viable governance after the fall of the previous regime. The first factor can be mitigated by thoughtful analysis and more thorough planning. The second can be avoided by only supporting regime change in places where new governments are likely to succeed.
Rather than reflexively oppose regime change, American policy makers should remember that past failures don’t preclude future successes. Careful analysis can identify risks, and planning can mitigate these risks. Only after this process is complete should policy makers decide if the dangers of regime change are worth hazarding. Instead, policy makers end up offering an immediate and outright rejection of regime change because they remember America’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Skeptics are right that the risks of regime change will often outweigh the potential benefits, but wrong when they claim that’s always the case. Iraq and Afghanistan are cautionary tales but shouldn’t be used in perpetuity to justify broad statements about the potential effectiveness of regime change. These conflicts offer useful lessons and important warnings, but they aren’t entirely predictive of future outcomes.
Iraq and Afghanistan taught Americans to be humble about what can be achieved by military power and to focus on the risks of regime change. These are critical lessons that can save the United States from future misadventures but it’s possible the U.S. learned its lesson too well. Each situation presents its own unique set of risks and potential benefits and both American voters and policy makers should accept the possibility that regime change is sometimes the best available option and that success is possible. That acceptance should rarely, if ever, drive unilateral American action to topple a government, but if a nation’s own people are doing most of the work even in the face of grave personal danger, there are actions the United States can take to tilt the balance in their favor. These actions can only be honestly considered if Americans grow beyond their automatic rejection of regime change.
As the Iranian government reasserts control through the largest repression of its people in years, the moment for bold American action has passed. American policy makers should use this time to consider the pros and cons of decisive action in the future, focusing on the circumstances that would produce an environment conducive to regime change. Critical to that analysis is an understanding of how Iran’s opposition would respond to an American military intervention. If an attack galvanizes support for the regime by making regime opponents look like foreign agents, then American military action is counterproductive in the extreme. That outcome, however, isn’t guaranteed.
American military action will no doubt increase support for the regime among hardline elements and those groups with a vested interest in the current system. It seems unlikely, however, that anti-regime protestors would suddenly change their position and rally to the regime’s side. The real danger of American intervention is that it turns neutral segments of Iran’s population against protestors and increases their support for the regime. One way to limit the likelihood of this outcome is to restrict military action to attacks on Iranian forces that are moving to repress protestors. This includes forces based beyond the immediate areas of unrest if these forces begin preparations for deployment. The U.S. can limit the chance of galvanizing Iranian resistance if it’s seen as acting only in the defense of protestors. Limiting American action in this way means that regime change will only be viable if the Iranian people themselves rise in mass, but an organic Iranian revolution is better in any case than one imposed by American forces. Whatever the risks, any honest assessment must begin with an acknowledgment that Iran’s government poses real threats that may become more significant in the future.
Recent unfavorable events for Iran have not changed the country’s regional ambitions. These are the same ambitions that encouraged conflict and worked against American interests for decades. The U.S. is missing an opportunity if it fails to exploit Iran’s present weakness to extract concessions over its nuclear program and its support for hostile actors in the region. The Houthis should not continue to receive anti-ship and ballistic missiles as the regime in Tehran struggles to survive. Iran is unlikely, however, to make extraordinary concessions unless it believes the U.S. is willing to apply the type of pressure that might lead to the fall of its government. This is why it’s important for American policy makers to accept that regime change is sometimes a legitimate and viable course of action.
Convincing Iran that America sees regime change as a viable option under the right conditions is important to U.S. efforts to shape the Iranian regime’s behavior. Unfortunately, Iran may believe that American public opinion precludes decisive American action. One way to address that Iranian perception is for President Donald Trump to work with Congress to pass a war powers resolution authorizing military action against Iran’s regime. Support from Congress would counteract the perception that Americans are unwilling under any circumstances to pursue regime change. This is particularly important since the decision to leave Venezuela’s government intact reinforced the idea that America lacks the political will to pursue regime change. This weakened America’s coercive power by indicating the limits of its potential action.
There are also good reasons to avoid regime change in Iran. These include the chance of civil war and the possibility that Iran’s territory becomes ungoverned space that shelters terrorists. The fall of Iran’s regime might destabilize neighboring countries and there’s always the risk that something unexpected happens that exacerbates rather than improves regional security. These are serious risks, but there are also risks associated with leaving the regime in place.
In 1956 and 1968, the U.S. decided it was too unsafe to support Hungarians and Czechs when they rose against their Soviet backed governments, fearful that doing so might start a nuclear war. The risk of intervention in these cases could not be mitigated enough to justify the potential gains. The calculus with Iran is different, especially if the use of nuclear weapons is viewed as the ultimate risk since Iran lacks a nuclear capability but may acquire one in the future. Iran is highly disruptive today and may become truly dangerous tomorrow. Access to nuclear arms, even if it never uses them, will increase Iran’s ability to pursue other destabilizing actions by deterring a response from the United States or Israel.
Most members of Congress who served in Iraq and Afghanistan are quick to criticize any talk of regime change. Their reaction is always understandable and fair if the circumstances being evaluated have strong echoes of the ones that existed in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to American action. The U.S. is making a mistake, however, if it defaults to the idea that regime change is never worth the risk and always destined to fail. America should be cautious before acting in ways intended to either change a regime or plausibly lead to its fall. To maintain maximum deterrence and full coercive power, however, rogue regimes must believe the United States can pursue their demise. America should never ignore the risks of regime change but it should never fail to recognize the possible benefits and dangers averted when hostile regimes fall.
*image credit: VOA.
