Limitations of Security Sector Reform in Countering Al-Shabaab in Somalia July 28, 2021
Over the past few years, al-Shabaab’s insurgency in
Somalia has gained strength despite the significant amount of foreign
assistance dedicated to security sector reform (SSR) in the country. An
al-Qaeda branch, al-Shabaab’s strength has varied over time, but ultimately the
group has remained remarkably resilient to increased military pressure
leveraged against it since 2007. Despite some tactical successes against
insurgent groups, the conflict in Somalia remains, at best, at a stalemate since
2016, while al-Shabaab has proved capable of expanding its activities. Notably,
the group’s activities have increased
33% since
2019, and over 2020 alone al-Shabaab conducted at least
30 suicide attacks.
The group
has also expanded its operational reach and tempo in northeastern
Kenya and northern
Somalia.
Beyond its attacks, al-Shabaab’s growing strength is also evident in its recent
territorial gains,
its ability to collect taxes and adjudicate matters in government-controlled
territories, and its governance structures that rival and undermine the legitimacy of state institutions. In light of the recent political
impasse around
the 2021 elections, not to mention the United
States’ military repositioning and Ethiopia’s troop drawdown –
due to conflict in Tigray –, security force assistance efforts, if they
continue as they have, will be insufficient at strategically altering the
course of al-Shabaab’s insurgency.
Three reasons explain
why SSR efforts have failed to break through the current stalemate in the
conflict with al-Shabaab. First, SSR efforts have been uncoordinated, resulting
in domestic forces that lack cohesion, are institutionally underdeveloped and are unprepared for the successful transfer of security responsibilities
from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping forces. Since
2008, foreign military assistance to Somalia has substantially increased.
However, due to the fractious political dynamic of the nation, such assistance
has resulted in the creation of numerous Somali security forces. Most of this assistance
has been directed to the federal government in Mogadishu for the development of
the Somali National Army (SNA), but some security donors have bypassed the
authority of the FGS to directly assist local forces existing at the federal
member state (FMS) level.
Consequently,
several different forces exist at the federal and member-state level, each with
their own
loyalties, capabilities, and priorities. This has not only exacerbated
tensions between the FGS and FMS, it has also undermined efforts to develop
cohesive and collaborative security forces across the nation. In fact,
rivalries and clashes between various security forces/units are not uncommon.
For instance, firefights broke out in the Gedo region over
2020 between forces loyal to the federal government, on one side, and the
Jubbaland regional state’s security forces, on the other, resulting in
fatalities and the displacement of thousands. In Mogadishu, the
Eritrean-trained National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and various
military units have been known to clash, while
similar rivalries and battles exist between military units and within NISA itself.
Beyond
these rivalries, the SNA, which has received significant donor assistance,
remains unprofessional and can best be described as “a
collection of former militia” with clan loyalties that
supersede force cohesion. Accordingly, the SNA can easily fracture as evidenced
by the recent dangerous political impasse over the elections where units abandoned
base/defected and retreated
to their clan strongholds. Admittedly, the SNA does have elite
and capable units such as the US-trained Danab and the Turkish-supported Gorgor
unit, as well as a military police unit known as Haram’aad. But none of these
units are well-placed for the successful transfer of security responsibilities
nor do they operate entirely impartially. For instance, forces like NISA,
Gorgor, and Haram’aad were used by the federal government against opposition
parties in February
2021.
Given these rivalries and the lack of force cohesion, AMISOM’s withdrawal in
December 2021 is wishful thinking.
Second,
there is an asymmetry
of interests between
international donors and local political elites; while the former is concerned
with counterterrorism and the development of militaries, the latter is more
concerned with securing their local power bases and fending off political
opponents. Moreover, though residents’ expectations for security and governance
in much of southern Somalia are largely unknown, recent works in localities
like Kismayo
and Baidoa reveal
that residents care about local forces’ preparedness to
address threats posed by groups like al-Shabaab, as well as the extent to which
security actors are representative
of local clans.
Consequently, prioritizing security assistance to the SNA and other
federal forces means that national forces tend to be deployed to regions where
they lack local ties to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of locals, not to
mention the reported corruption within the
central government which
undermines efforts to transfer funding to regional actors.
This leads
to the third and key reason why SSR efforts have been unsuccessful; such
efforts have not been part of a viable strategy aimed at resolving the broader
political crisis in Somalia. Though the international community has focused
almost single-mindedly on countering al-Shabaab, the conflict in Somalia is
fundamentally local. Underlying the political impasse that currently exists
between the federal government and regional FMS, as well as the challenges
around force cohesion and security force rivalry is the unaddressed political
tensions that brought about the country’s decent into civil war in the late 80s
and early 90s. The absence of
meaningful reconciliation between clans has meant that
political frameworks meant to solve political tensions have suffered from chronic
distrust and poor implementation. Al-Shabaab benefits from this
situation. Not only does the group’s origins trace
back to civil conflict in Somalia, but al-Shabaab has also become “domesticated” –
i.e., it controls territory, governs, and exploits local political grievances
to undermine the legitimacy of the state and expand its influence.
Accordingly, political reconciliation is needed for SSR to actually work. This involves a genuine reconciliation of the political tensions that exist between the FGS and FMS and the clan dynamics that underlie the existing political impasse. To effectively combat al-Shabaab and build more cooperative forces, Somalia as a state needs to be more politically consolidated. Therefore, foreign military assistance needs to be a part of a broader viable political settlement to the conflict. International partners, particularly the United States needs to adopt a more comprehensive overhaul to their approach in the region. This means recognizing that a militarized solution to the conflict is not feasible. Conducting airstrikes and training government forces can boast some tactical successes, but this approach is ultimately insufficient to strategically alter the trajectory of the conflict which currently favors al-Shabaab. A negotiated settlement to the broader conflict between governing actors should be the priority.
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